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ABSTRACT 
This work examines the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its capacity for 
preventing and deterring atrocity crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes) in relation to its historical development and current standing. 
Prevention and deterrence at the international level are very difficult to measure 
empirically, so this work focuses on the perceived successes and challenges of the 
ICC’s deterrent capacity as a “Court of last resort," in light of international legal 
and institutional norms. The Court, now in its thirteenth year, is the first of its kind, 
leaving it vulnerable to (sometimes) unrealistic criticisms and expectations as it 
builds a network of external cooperation and works to modify its procedures in 
favor of effectiveness and efficiency for the coming years. In analyzing the various 
claims, I argue that while deterrence is not total, the ICC has developed a growing 
preventative impact that will continue to progress alongside as well as shape the 





The International Criminal Court (ICC) is still described as being in its infancy since it 
became operational in 2002. Since it began thirteen years ago, efficiency has been difficult to 
measure, particularly in the realm of deterring and/or preventing atrocity crimes. Influenced 
heavily by twentieth-century international tribunals, the ICC is the first permanent international 
criminal court designed to end impunity for the perpetration of the gravest of crimes. 
The Court was created through the negotiation efforts of representatives of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1998 resulting in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding document. 
According to the Rome Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction covers three primary crimes: genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.1 As listed in the Rome Statute’s preamble, the ICC is 
“determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute 
to the prevention of such crimes.”2 
There are mixed perspectives on whether or not the International Criminal Court can be 
seen as an institute of preventative measures and many scholars believe that prevention should 
not be an explicit goal of the Court. However, I argue that the Court is an institution with 
preventative and deterrent impact, perhaps in some ways subtler than others, and that we need to 
maintain realistic expectations of the Court and its potential. To do this, I explain the 
development and current state of the International Criminal Court, discuss methods of prevention 
and deterrence that have been used to date, examine the challenges to global deterrence of 
atrocity crimes, and review the realistic expectations of the Court at this stage of its existence. 
Methodology 
 The research for this project was done in multiple facets. The idea for this project 
developed in the Spring 2015 semester while taking POLS 389 – International Law and 
Organizations with instructor Dawn Willis, where I was able to conduct preliminary research 
through law and literature reviews on the topic.  
Once the topic was solidified, I participated in a trip to The Hague, Netherlands with the 
Peace, Justice, and the International Courts study abroad program where I worked under the 
direct supervision of Dr. J.D. Bowers with additional guidance from Dr. Delia Popescu of Le 
Moyne College in Syracuse, New York. I used this visit to further my research using sources 
from the Peace Palace Library, the second oldest law-specific library in the world. 
Visiting The Hague also allowed me to conduct one-on-one interviews with faculty 
members specializing in international law, transitional justice, and criminology. I first 
interviewed Dr. Maarten van Munster, senior lecturer in Human Rights Law and European 
Union Law at De Haagse Hogeschool (The Hague University of Applied Sciences). My second 
one-on-one interview was with Dr. Joris van Wijk, Associate Professor of Criminology and 
Executive Director of The Center for International Criminal Justice at Vrije Universiteit (VU) 
Amsterdam. 
																																																								
1 These crimes will be referred to collectively as ‘atrocity crimes.’ The ICC’s jurisdiction also 
extends to crimes of aggression but as this crime has not been defined by consensus, it will be 
ignored for the duration of this paper, as it has not yet become a crime that is investigated or 
prosecuted by the Court.  
2 United Nations. Preamble of "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." Rome: Un 
ited Nations, 1998. 
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In addition to one-on-one interviews, I was able to gain valuable information from guest 
lecturers, as they were part of the larger Peace, Justice, and International Courts program. At the 
NIOD Institute of War, Genocide, and Holocaust Studies in Amsterdam, Netherlands, I was able 
to speak with Dr. Johannes ten Houwink ten Cate and Dr. Kjell Anderson, Professor and 
Researcher/Coordinator Master of the Holocaust and Genocide Studies Program at University of 
Amsterdam respectively. 
In The Hague, I received the opportunity to speak with a researcher from The Hague 
Institute for Global Justice (HIGJ) to include Dr. Eamon Aloyo, Senior Researcher, along with 
Dr. Anthony Lang and Dr. Andrea Birdsall, who would present together at a conference hosted 
by the HIGJ. Last but not least, I was also able to gain insight from employees of the Office of 
the Prosecutor from within the International Criminal Court, including Stanislas Talontsi, the 
Judicial Cooperation assistant, as well as the Lead investigator of three current ICC 
investigations. Due to the confidentiality necessary for such a position, I have agreed to respect 
this person’s wish for anonymity. 
The Development and Current State of the ICC 
As of July 2015, there are currently 123 State Parties that have both signed and ratified 
the Rome Statute. This means that more than 60% of sovereign states have willingly accepted the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and so far, none that have ratified have 
withdrawn from the ICC. However, there are more than 70 sovereign states have not signed or 
ratified the Rome Statute, including states such as Russia, China, India, and the United States, 
each of which contain large portions of the world’s population. This means that over half of the 
global population is not protected by the jurisdiction of the ICC and that three of the Permanent 
Five (P5) UN Security Council states are not members.3 
 
The ICC is the first of its kind in regards to being the first permanent, treaty-based 
international criminal court designed to hold individuals accountable for “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community.”4 The Court itself is modeled after the ex post 
facto and ad hoc courts that came before it. The earliest international tribunals include the 
Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Trials, both of which were set up by the Allied victors of World 
War II.5 These began and ended in the 1940s in the aftermath of the Second World War in order 
to deal with the perpetrators of crimes that were larger in scale than the modern world had ever 
seen. 
The two tribunals that most directly influenced the structure of the ICC are the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 																																																								
3 International Criminal Court, State Parties to the Rome Statute (Chronological List). 2015. 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%
20statute.aspx (accessed March 19, 2015). 
4 International Criminal Court, About the Court. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (accessed April 
2, 2015). 
5 Philippe Kirsch, "The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International 
Criminal Law." American University International Law Review 22, no. 4 (2007):540. 
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Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which were created in the 1990s following the outbreak of 
wars that lead to genocides in both regions. These two ad hoc courts were set up directly by the 
United Nations Security Council for the purpose of direct participation and oversight by the UN. 
 
When the International Criminal Court was created, it was developed to bear in mind the 
limitations that had been seen in the four aforementioned tribunals and to improve upon them 
where possible. To begin, these four tribunals had been created by only a few states each and 
were highly dependent on the political will of the time.6 The ICC’s creation was also dependent 
on the political will of the time, explaining why it was not created in 1937 under the efforts of 
the League of Nations where the concept originated. However, its design as a permanent court is 
meant to remove any further reliance upon timely political will.7 
These four historic tribunals were limited to events in the past rather than ongoing 
conflicts (save the former Yugoslavia) and jurisdiction was limited to specific geographical 
locations and temporal constraints. The Nuremberg Trials dealt with war crimes committed by 
the ruling Nazi Party during World War II; the Tokyo Trials dealt with the leaders most 
responsible for the war crimes that had been perpetrated by the Empire of Japan during the same 
period; the ICTY deals with those most responsible for committing genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity within the territory that makes up the former Yugoslavia from 1 January 
1991 through 2001; and the ICTR handles those accused of the same crimes committed in 
Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.8  
The ICC was developed to keep in mind the exorbitant costs of establishing and 
pioneering ad hoc courts such as the ICTY and ICTR. These institutions often saw delays in 
procedural and operational development because they were the first of their kind, specifically 
meant for all operations to be completed and the tribunals closed after a predicted amount of 
time.9 At its peak budget, the ICTY and ICTR made up a collective 10% of the United Nations 
annual operational budget. This includes factors such as translation costs that would not normally 
be found in the standard operating procedures of domestic courts and the two tribunals have been 
repeatedly subjected to public defenses of their budgets.10 
In addition to these factors, it was a goal of international criminal tribunals to punish 
perpetrators and deter future atrocity crimes from happening but results have been limited.11 The 
best-known failure to prevent atrocity crimes comes in the example of the genocide that occurred 
at Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The July 1995 massacre occurred after the ICTY was already 
operational (1993) and those most responsible, both Republika Srpska President Radovan 																																																								
6 Kirsch, 540. 
7 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. (New York: 
The New Press, 2012), 503. 
8 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 448. 
9 Kirsch, 540. 
10 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Cost of Justice. 2015. 
http://www.icty.org/sid/325 (accessed May 16, 2015). 
11 Kirsch, 541; Mariana Rodríguez-Pareja and Salvador Herencia-Carrasco, At the ICC, There is 
no Deterrence without Resources. June 10, 2015. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mariana-rodr%C3%ADguezpareja-salvador-
herenciacarrasco/at-icc-there-is-no-deterrence-wit (accessed June 10, 2015). 
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Karadžić and Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić, had already been indicted.12 It has 
since become the mindset of the International Criminal Court to end the established culture of 
impunity and prevent atrocity crimes through various means. 
 
In order to accomplish such an extensive goal, it is important to recognize where the 
Court differs from its predecessors. First, the UN General Assembly developed the ICC but once 
the Rome Statute was negotiated and completed, the ICC became an independent entity 
entirely.13 This means that the ICC’s budget is independent from the UN’s annual budget with 
the funding coming from each of the 123 State Parties and is decided based on a budgetary 
system developed by the UN to determine each State Party’s capacity to pay indicative of current 
financial situations.14 This bears in mind that the UN only provides the system for determining 
each State’s contribution but does not include any other input, enforcement, or financial support. 
Second, the ICC is the first international court negotiated and created by an international 
treaty, allowing for the input and negotiation of all UN Member States.15 A vast majority, 160 
UN Member States, participated in the drafting of the Rome Statute and is formerly 
unprecedented for the intended nature of the Court’s work. In the Rome Conference, the issue of 
individual criminal liability was heavily modeled around Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions because it is already widely accepted, sexual violence was explicitly branded a war 
crime, and “command liability” was clearly established as a basis for liability to reflect the 
evolution of the crime as dealt with by the ICTY.16 
Following the Rome Conference, a Preparatory Committee met for over three years in 
order to develop the Court’s functionality through the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Elements of Crimes, the Relationship Agreement between the Court and the United Nations, the 
Financial Regulations, and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court.17  
While judges typically develop these procedures and details, the initial State Parties took it upon 
themselves to determine the specifics as a way to ensure that the Court’s potentially universal 
jurisdiction would remain a purely judicial court and avoid any unnecessary influence of politics 
in the Court’s decisions.18 
 
To fully understand the International Criminal Court’s overall impact in dealing with 
atrocity crimes, one needs to understand how cases enter the Court and what cases it has seen 
thus far. The ICC is able to begin cases in three ways: any State Party may refer a case 
happening on its own territory or by its own nationals, the UN Security Council may refer a case 
(whether it is a State Party or non-State Party), and the Prosecutor may begin an investigation of 
																																																								
12 Theodor Meron, "Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans." Foreign Affairs, 
Jan/Feb 1997. 
13 Kirsch, 541. 
14 Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Budget and Finance Record. 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=budgetbackground (accessed June 25, 2015). 
15 Kirsch, 541. 
16 Robertson, 505. 
17 Kirsch, 541; Coalition for the International Criminal Court, History of the ICC. 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory (accessed July 5, 2015). 
18 Kirsch, 541. 
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their own will (proprio motu) of State Parties with the authorization of the Court’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber.19 
While the Court aims to end the impunity of individual perpetrators, the Court has 
historically sought out the highest-level perpetrators most responsible for the crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the cases are organized by the states where armed conflict is 
occurring, followed by a list of individuals within each state that have allegedly committed 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute to allow for standardized organization of 
investigations and findings. 
Currently, five cases of self-referral sit before the Court, including the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Mali, and two investigations in the Central African 
Republic (CAR & CAR II).20 The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has initiated two investigations 
using the power of proprio motu: Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, where it was found that the countries 
were either unwilling or unable to handle these crimes on a domestic level and they failed to 
refer themselves to the Court for judiciary assistance.21 This power is significant because it is the 
first time in history that an international prosecutor has had the authority to independently open 
investigations in places where crimes have been committed.22  
The UN Security Council is also responsible for the referral of two active cases to include 
the Sudanese government on suspicion of state-sponsored violence in Darfur and the Libyan 
government on charges of brutal repression of popular protests during the Arab Spring.23 It is 
worthy to note that while State Parties and the OTP have rigid regulations for referring or 
opening a case, referrals by the UN Security Council do not have to meet any particular 
standards but face their own challenges in that a single P5 veto may terminate a referral before it 
ever reaches the Office of the Posecutor.24 Geoffrey Robertson (2012)  notes the difficulties of 
passing an ICC referral through the Security Council, stating that UN Security Council referrals 
are more likely to occur if none of the individuals sought for allegedly committing atrocity 
crimes has a superpower supporter.25 Both of the situations in Darfur and Libya passed through 
the UN Security Council to reach the OTP but others have failed. 
The majority of the investigations thus far have been regarding internally armed conflicts 
rather than inter-state conflicts. This has important legal ramifications because whether the 
crimes are committed internally or between states, the nature of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes exceed domestic law and enter the realm of international law in the 
event that domestic rule of law is unwilling or incapable of handling judicial proceedings.  																																																								
19 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 4th Edition. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
20 Andrew Novak, The International Criminal Court: An Introduction. (New York: Springer, 
2015), 72-73. 
21 Novak, 72-73. 
22 Fatou Bensouda, "Setting the Record Straight: The ICC's New Prosecutor Responds to African 
Concerns." Seminar Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Pretoria, 2012, 4. 
23 Terrence L. Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin. "Ratification Patterns and the International 
Criminal Court." International Studies Quarterly 57 (2013): 401; Novak, 72-73; United Nations 
Security Council. "Resolution 1593." 2005; United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1970." 
2011. 
24 Bensouda, “Setting the Record Straight,” 6. 
25 Robertson, 507. 
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In addition to the twenty-two cases being built within the nine investigations 
aforementioned, there are nine preliminary examinations underway across the world. Honduras, 
Colombia, Guinea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ukraine, Georgia, and Palestine have each been 
under careful watch and initial analysis by the OTP while it determines if the crimes brought 
forth are admissible under the Court’s jurisdiction.26 These include both domestic and inter-state 
conflicts and the OTP is working to determine if judicial proceedings within each state qualify as 
being properly handled by international standards. 
The ICC’s current agenda is both overbearing and underwhelming. The Court has active 
investigations going on in nine situations with preliminary examinations occurring in another 
nine situations and only two convictions have resulted in thirteen years of work. Resources are 
limited and international demands for global justice suggest this level of capacity does not meet 
expectations and so we must analyze what progress the Court has made in its mandate and what 
challenges currently hinder the ICC from operating at its optimal capacity. 
Methods of Prevention and Deterrence 
Deterrence through Ratification of the Rome Statute 
The first and original method of deterrence of atrocity crimes is the ratification of the 
Rome Statute that declares a state’s willing membership to abide by the Court’s jurisdiction.27 
There are, however, dissenting views on what states are more or less likely to ratify the Rome 
Statute through pattern analysis and this more so pertains to state officials rather than individuals 
or rebel and/or paramilitary groups.  
Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner (2010) describe the patterns of Rome Statute 
ratification in the following way: “The states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to 
the possibility of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the ICC, 
while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to hold leaders accountable do 
not.”28 This would be a viable explanation as to why more vulnerable states such as the African 
states of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, and Uganda have 
joined as well as less vulnerable states such as The Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark, where 
vulnerability in this regard refers to a state’s potential to see its nationals prosecuted by the ICC.  
Simmons and Danner’s argument concerning “potentially vulnerable states with credible 
alternative means to hold leaders accountable” would fit the reasoning behind the United States’ 
conscious efforts to avoid ratification of the Rome Statute since the George W. Bush 
Administration. Because the United States features a strong rule of law in comparison to many 
developing states and the country feels very strongly about being responsible for handling the 
legal and judicial affairs of its own nationals, the U.S. removed its signature of the Rome Statute 
in order to allow the presidential administration (and subsequently the U.S. military) the ability 
to operate as it believes is needed, which may at times violate the nature of the crimes within the 																																																								
26 International Criminal Court, "OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014." 
Preliminary Examination, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, The Hague, 
2014. 
27 Eamon Aloyo and Agnese Macaluso, interview by Shanay Murdock. The Hague, (June 4, 
2015). 
28 Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal 
Court." International Organization 64, no. 2 (April 2010): 225. 
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jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. American exceptionalism is one of the main arguments against 
relinquishing any level of sovereignty to the ICC.29 In addition, both Russia and China are on the 
UN Security Council P5 and are known for human rights abuses; they too have refrained from 
the ratification of the Rome Statute, wishing like the U.S. to maintain national sovereignty 
without relinquishing any power to the International Criminal Court. 
Terrence L. Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin take a different approach in response to 
Simmons and Danner. Their research from 2013 states that “democracies with little internal 
violence are the most likely countries to join the ICC,” while “countries with the most to fear 
from ICC prosecutions—non-democracies with weak legal systems and a history of domestic 
political violence, tend to avoid ratification.”30 Chapman and Chaudoin justify this in terms of 
the experiences of internal conflict in the 1990s, suggesting that states that ratified the Rome 
Statute experienced lesser civil violence than states that did not ratify the statute.31 They argue 
that Sub-Saharan Africa is the exception to the pattern, despite a large number of Sub-Saharan 
African states having become State Parties (21 out of the 34 African states that ratified did so by 
the year the Court became operational) and despite this region dominating focus of the Court so 
far.32 
Simmons and Danner also argue that ratification of the Rome Statute is equivalent to a 
credible commitment, signaling a desire to strengthen rule of law within each individual state 
and prevent the occurrence of the atrocity crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.33 They have 
also noted that those states seeing conflict prior to the ratification of the Rome Statute typically 
see a break in fighting upon ratification, particularly in civil or domestic armed conflict where 
attempts at peace negotiations may then occur which may or may not end successfully.34 
Designing their article as a response to Simmons and Danner, Chapman and Chaudoin further 
expand by stating that existing democracies are less in need of this commitment as their 
institutions should already be designed to refrain from atrocity crimes while non-democracies 
with recent histories of internal conflict are most in need of making this commitment and being 
held to it, yet commitments have been made by each extreme end of the continuum while others 
from each end have yet to ratify.35 
Deterrence through Norm-Setting 
In a speech given in 2012, former ICC President Judge Sang-Hyun Song highlighted 
three categories of actions in which the International Criminal Court is seeking to prevent and 
deter atrocity crimes. He listed deterrence through norm setting, deterrence through prosecution 
																																																								
29Philippe Lagassé, "The International Criminal Court and the Foreign Policies of the United 
States." International Journal (Sage Publications, LTD.) 59, no. 2 (2004): 430. 
30 Chapman & Chaudoin, 400. 
31 Ibid, 402-403. 
32 Ibid, 402; International Criminal Court, African States. 2013. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/african%20states.aspx (accessed 
July 14, 2015). 
33 Simmons & Danner, 225. 
34 Ibid, 253. 
35 Chapman & Chaudoin, 401. 
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and/or threat of prosecution, and deterrence through peace building and stabilization, each of 
which has several components to the concept.36  
The first of which, norm setting, has the most potential for further growth and is the most 
in need of further development.37 Katharine A. Marshall suggested in 2010 that the ICC has the 
ability to set the example for state conduct in regards to strengthening rule of law and refraining 
from such crimes but the ICC relies heavily upon international institutions, NGOs, and above all, 
State Parties to implement the norms established by the Rome Statute.38  
Judge Song suggested that norm setting allows for the development of both legal and 
moral norms that are designed to make crimes both unacceptable and punishable in a number of 
ways. Stephen Pinker discusses a “growing intolerance of human society towards war, torture, 
and other forms of brutality, reflecting a normative [moral] shift in what is viewed as acceptable 
and part of the status quo.”39 Sixty years ago, domestic concerns were far from the attention of 
the developing international community.40 With this development in the global mentality, there 
has been a growth in international politics where a stronger demand for the protection of human 
rights has occurred. This has put greater pressure on international institutions to monitor the 
conduct of state leaders and to critique domestic affairs, essentially sidestepping the traditional 
ideas of sovereignty.41 This reliance includes dependence on the success of conflict prevention 
and mediation tactics, whether to garner peace or negative peace, meaning the absence of 
conflict.42 
While other international institutions such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International focus on the exposure of human rights violations in a variety of ways, the Rome 
Statute creates the opportunity to realize international justice by operating one standard to all its 
State Parties.43 This removes any biases from dealing with any particular regions and ensures fair 
trials with predictable results. The Court has been criticized for this standard being too Western 
in design but this criticism will be addressed further in the following section regarding the 
challenges to affecting global deterrence of atrocity crimes. 
Because of the nature of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the last two 
decades have seen major developments and overlap in both international criminal law and 
																																																								
36 Judge Sang-Hyun Song, "From Punishment to Prevention: Reflections on the Future of 
International Criminal Justice." Wallace Wurth Memorial Lecture. Sydney, 2012: 6. 
37 Judge Sang-Hyun Song, "International Criminal Court: The Centrepiece of an Evolving 
System of International Criminal Justice." Introductory Remarks at St. Petersburg State 
University. St. Petersburg, 2013. 
38 Katharine A. Marshall, "Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court: 
A Positive Approach." Human Rights Brief 17, no. 2 (2010): 21. 
39 Stephen Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its 
Causes. (London: Penguin Books, 2011); Nick Grono, The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the 
Commission of International Crimes by Government Leaders. October 5, 2012. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrent-effect-of-the-




43 Bensouda, “Setting the Record Straight,” 3. 
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international humanitarian law.44 While humanitarian law has been developing since observers 
saw the brutality and severity of World War I, international criminal law is a whole new realm as 
the global community has recognized individual criminal liability for atrocity crimes rather than 
state-wide responsibility as the global community has grown to realize that governments and 
rebel groups do not always act in ways that represent the wishes and/or beliefs of the people. 
The Office of the Prosecutor works directly with State Parties, providing for the 
development of international legal language and precedent by means of strengthening the rule of 
law in individual states. In the earliest years of the ICC, the OTP issued indictments of major 
actors in the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. While ultimately unsuccessful, it was 
among the first attempts to break the culture of impunity in the Great Lakes region of Africa 
where conflict has occurred for decades.45 It is worthy to note that the ICC has shown to have a 
stronger positive deterrent effect on governments than it has on rebel forces but this also relates 
to the fact that governments are typically held more accountable for negative actions within the 
international community while rebel groups maintain very little accountability outside of the 
group itself, as seen with the LRA in Uganda.  
As Lead Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda stated in 2012, norm setting also allows the ICC to 
ensure proper national implementation of legal and judicial standards at the domestic level 
through close communication and collaboration. The ICC has used this relationship to verify if 
national proceedings are transpiring in places where known violations of the Rome Statute have 
occurred and the OTP has begun preliminary examinations in Guinea, Colombia, and Georgia 
for this reason.46 
Reform, while weak, has been notable in Uganda, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire where 
jurisdiction mobilizes domestic actors and encourages necessary domestic reforms such as the 
implementation of the Rome Statute crimes in national level jurisdiction.47 This has helped to set 
the precedent that there is no automatic immunity for government leaders, past or current, if 
responsible for atrocity crimes.48 
Both increases in domestic proceedings and decreases in violence have occurred due to 
monitoring domestic investigatory practices. As of the 2014 OTP Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities, the majority of countries under preliminary examination have received 
visits from the OTP to verify claims of cases of abuse, domestic proceedings, and to gather 
further information.49 Between 2005 and 2006, Colombia implemented the Peace and Justice 
Law that worked to demobilize paramilitary and guerrilla groups in order for all three sides of a 
decades-long conflict that includes the Colombian government to help avoid any prosecutions by 
the ICC.50 Nigeria, a state that is also under preliminary examination by the OTP, has set up a 
22-member panel to investigate the pre- and post-election violence primarily in the Akwa Ibom 																																																								
44 Johannes ten Cate, interview by Shanay Murdock. NIOD Introduction Amsterdam, (May 29, 
2015). 
45 Grono. 
46 Bensouda, “Setting the Record Straight,” 3. 
47 Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons. "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?" 
Working Paper, 2014: 3. 
48 Grono. 
49 International Criminal Court, "OTP Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014," 10, 




state since the 2011 general elections.51 Even with the ICC dropping the case against Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta, many say there was a decrease in violence in the latest election due to 
the ICC’s continual monitoring of activities in the state.52  
In addition to the implementation of legal standards, norm setting promotes education 
and awareness designed to help individuals seek methods of conflict resolution rather than 
resorting to armed conflict. This transparency of OTP activities encouraged the increase of 
interest and work in both domestic and international NGOs in states such as Nigeria.53 Since the 
opening of the preliminary examination in Honduras, the ICC has increased communications 
with the 2010-2011 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, domestic civil society 
organizations, as well as the government of Honduras.54 Despite significant security challenges, 
the OTP has worked with the states where the ICC is most focused to keep affected communities 
aware of relevant judicial developments. Through the use of radio and television broadcasts 
systems, the OTP has been able to provide locals with hearing summaries and answers to the 
frequently asked questions that the Court has received.55 The idea behind this transparency and 
active communication is that education plays a transformative role in building community 
resilience and preventing and easing violent conflict.56 
 
The ICC has taken to investigating and prosecuting mid- and lower-level perpetrators 
where appropriate as this allows for the upwards strengthening of cases against those most 
responsible for atrocity crimes.57 The prosecution of mid- and lower-level perpetrators is thought 
to increase the deterrent effect of the Court because it encourages potential perpetrators to realize 
that they may be vulnerable to the Court’s jurisdiction and suggests a necessity to reconsider 
their strategies.58 Of the various deterrent tactics the Court has used, indictments seem to be 
among the least effective as seen in both Libya and Sudan where sitting leaders have been 
defiant of the Court and have continually attempted to undermine the Court’s legitimacy, yet 
neither Libya or Sudan have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction and were referred by the UN 
Security Council.59 
Over the course of the Court’s development, the OTP has continued developing its 
operational approach and Strategic Plans while learning from past mistakes and limitations. 																																																								
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Facing setbacks such as the dismissal of charges against President Kenyatta due to concern of 
widespread witness intimidation and the acquittal of Congolese army colonel Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, the Court has used these challenges to implement changes in investigatory strategies to 
help mitigate the reoccurrence of these types of challenges.60 Part of the strategy has been to 
combine or separate collective trials when appropriate. The Court combined cases in Côte 
d’Ivoire and separated cases in the Uganda trials in order to make the trials more efficient 
because the apprehension of one alleged criminal without the rest delays the proceedings unless 
that individual is tried separately.61 
Every three years, the OTP provides a three-year operational strategy that proposes 
desired objectives, transparency, and predictability in the Court’s proceedings. Prosecutor 
Bensouda announced the 2016-2018 Strategic Plan to include “the development of a coordinated 
strategy with key partners to effectively investigate and prosecute perpetrators of mass crimes in 
order to close the impunity gaps.”62 This partnership with local, domestic, and international 
organizations helps not only to effectively investigate and prosecute those responsible for such 
crimes but also builds the Court’s legitimacy as an international judicial institution that maintains 
the support of non-state actors in addition to the Assembly of State Parties. 
 Beyond the development of language and the strengthening of rule of law, the Office of 
the Prosecutor has worked tirelessly to increase the cooperation of states on an international 
field. As of 2012, African states, including non-State Parties, received over 50% of the Court’s 
requests for cooperation and over 70% of those requests were met with a positive response.63 In 
2009, Lead Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo met with the President and Prime Minister of 
Kenya to establish cooperation and prevent any further violence following the general elections, 
which has helped greatly.64 The presence of field offices has also greatly encouraged the 
collaboration of the ICC and state governments due to consistent monitoring and investigations 
occurring on a regular and local basis.65 
Cooperation of the State Parties includes the much-needed increase of resources for the 
ICC. Increased funds and cooperation resulted in the diversification of methods of collection and 
the forms of evidence to include increased forensic and cyber evidence, enhanced analytical 
capacities for the investigation teams, the ability to facility PEACE-model trainings, permanent 
field presence of investigations where possible, and additional efforts to identify those who are 
willing to cooperate for the purpose of investigations.66 
Impartiality in examinations and investigations is another large part of building 
cooperation between the ICC and its member states as it builds trust, standards of operation, and 
a legitimacy of objectivity by the Court. The ICC has made strong efforts to factually investigate 																																																								
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all sides of conflicts as to ensure fairness in any judicial proceedings and to guarantee 
predictability and universal application of the Court’s actions.67 
 
The International Criminal Court also maintains a potential for universal jurisdiction. The 
Court’s permanence is an advantage in that the Court is able to act without the delay of creation, 
it is able to correct mistakes made in the past, and it is able to form long-term relationships with 
both state and non-state actors to address violence as it occurs.68  
The Court has continuing temporal and geographic jurisdiction over a state following the 
state’s ratification of the Rome Statute, however it is important to note that ratification does not 
automatically trigger an examination or investigation.69 David Bosco described the permanence 
of the Court by stating “a standing court would present potential wrongdoers with the constant 
possibility of investigation and punishment.”70 At the start of the ICC’s operation in 2002, 
Afghan warlord Abdul Rashid Dotsum “reportedly called together all ninety of his senior 
commanders and required them to listen as an aide read out loud a human rights report detailing 
abuses they had committed.”71 It is suggested that Dotsum warned his commanders that a 
permanent criminal court was about to come into existence and that they could be prosecuted for 
any further crimes committed.  
If a state’s conflict extends both before and after the time of its ratification, the Court’s 
jurisdiction begins at the time of ratification/entry of force. Colombia has been experiencing an 
internal conflict that extends four decades with leftist rebel groups fighting right-wing 
paramilitary factions fighting the Colombian government where all sides have committed 
atrocity crimes resulting in approximately 3,000 deaths per year.72 Moreno-Ocampo stated 
“thousands had been killed, went missing, were kidnapped or forcibly displaced since 1 
November 2002” and so with the OTP’s presence, the Colombian government has taken the 
examination very seriously and vowed full cooperation with the ICC.73 
Since jurisdiction is based on willing membership through either ratification of the Rome 
Statute or the temporary acceptance of limited ICC jurisdiction, non-State Parties are able to 
utilize the ICC in the event that they opt to accept conditional jurisdiction from the Court such as 																																																								
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Ukraine has done. Ukraine’s acting government has requested limited jurisdiction from the ICC 
for the period of 17 November 2013 to 22 February 2014 in order to investigate crimes 
committed in the country during that time, allowing the ICC to open a preliminary 
examination.74 
 
The International Criminal Court is a court of last resort, operating on the basis of its 
Complementarity Clause, intervening in cases only if a State Party’s national judiciary cannot or 
will not commit to legitimate judicial proceedings. As ICC President Song described, “The 
Rome Statute and the principle of complementarity enshrined in it give the International 
Criminal Court what its predecessors lacked: power of deterrence.”75 Thousands of 
communications have been brought forth to the Court as reports of violations of the Rome 
Statute laws and so the Court is responsible for determining admissibility of jurisdiction. “An 
admissibility determination is not a judgment or reflection on the national justice system as a 
whole. If an otherwise functioning judiciary is not investigating or prosecuting the relevant 
case(s), the determining factor is the absence of relevant proceedings.”76 
A state’s national judiciary retains the right and primary duty to both investigate and 
prosecute violations of atrocity crimes as necessary. Positive complementarity is a concept used 
to describe the multitude of ways that the OTP works with States to ensure the Court stays a 
court of last resort. In states that are able but unwilling to handle proceedings domestically, the 
OTP has been effective by using more direct communication with states in order to motivate 
their own national-level proceedings through the expression of concerns but without the use of 
threats of escalation to the ICC.77 Positive complementarity has also been effective in cases 
where states are willing but unable to prosecute by allowing the OTP the ability to actively 
enhance a state’s capacity to complete investigations and prosecutions and assist in meeting 
international standards of justice.78  
Guinea’s domestic panel of judges has been investigating the stadium massacre and rapes 
that occurred in 2009 and with the help of the OTP’s involvement, the state indicted former self-
proclaimed president Captain Moussa Dadis Camara on 8 July 2015.79 As of 2011, Colombian 
authorities have carried out a great number of proceedings relevant to the crimes being examined 
by the OTP. Encouraged by discussions from the OTP,  
Colombia has an institutional apparatus available to investigate and prosecute crimes 
under the Rome Statute. Proceedings have been initiated against 1) illegal armed group 
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leaders, 2) paramilitary leaders, 3) police and army officials, 4) politicians with alleged 
links to armed groups, and 5) there are investigations into false positive cases.80 
 
In Georgia, 
The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation and the Chief Prosecutor of 
Georgia have been conducting separate investigations into incidents that could constitute 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC.  The proceedings have been the subject of 
regular consultations between the Office [of the Prosecutor] and the competent national 
authorities with a view to assessing whether they are actually willing and able to bring 
the perpetrators of crimes to justice.81 
 
 The OTP has also been very careful to avoid engaging in any investigations or 
prosecutions that are not “in the interest of justice” and drops any activities if this is the case. 
However, the interest of justice is not to be confused with the interests of peace and security. 
Peace and security are political considerations that remain outside of the Court’s mandate and the 
pursuit of justice allows the Court/OTP to remain within its legal boundaries. The international 
community has drawn clear boundaries in responsibility where the UN Security Council is 
responsible for maintaining peace and security while the ICC is responsible for international 
justice. Therefore the process of peace negotiations cannot be a dissuading factor in pursuing a 
case in the interest of justice.82 
Deterrence through (Threat of) Prosecution 
 The International Criminal Court maintains a permanent status as opposed to being an ex 
post facto or ad hoc court and so the Court is able to maintain a deterrent presence strictly 
through its continued existence.83 This continuous and already established presence allows for 
timely intervention from the Prosecutor amidst early stages and reports of atrocity crimes. The 
transparency of OTP monitoring shows those who are being tracked that they are being watched 
on a global scale and the threat of possible prosecution may be enough to make an individual 
reconsider his or her strategic approach in some cases.84 
 Through the OTP’s power of proprio motu, the OTP maintains the ability to open 
informal preliminary examinations (which require no permission) and formal investigations upon 
the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Neither preliminary examinations nor formal 
investigations are guaranteed to lead to trials before the ICC judges.85 The OTP seeks to act as an 
early warning system where it proactively collects open source information on the execution of 
crimes that fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.86 This early stage monitoring provides a means 
for early interaction with State Parties, NGOs, and other international organizations that may be 
able to verify the occurrence of crimes, encourage genuine national proceedings that meet the 																																																								
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standards of international proceedings, and help to prevent the reoccurrence of such atrocity 
crimes.87 
 The ICC’s involvement in three African cases highlight that judicial involvement of the 
Court “is more likely to help prevent atrocities than impede peace, even if arrest warrants cannot 
be executed.”88 In Côte d’Ivoire for instance, simply the threat of an ICC investigation helped 
prevent the further escalation of an inter-ethnic conflict by putting an end to state-sponsored 
incitement to hatred and ethnic division.89  
In Uganda, the arrest warrants of LRA leaders helped to deter Sudan from continuing to 
deliver a long-standing safe haven for the rebel group.90 The LRA still remains active in Uganda, 
South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with 
allegations of abductions and murders but Human Rights Watch has recorded these as occurring 
much less now than in previous years.91 The ICC’s attempts at keeping the LRA accountable for 
its actions has created a momentum that has “embedded criminal accountability and victims’ 
interests in the structure and vocabulary of the peace process,” making justice about both 
accountability and victims’ needs.92 And while atrocity crimes occurring in Darfur, Sudan are 
truly severe, the internal political divisions and political maneuvering have made the execution 
of atrocity crimes much more costly in recent years.93 
 
The threat of prosecution plays into the Rome Statute’s Complementarity Clause, first 
and foremost because it allows the Court to prompt national authorities to begin investigations as 
to avoid the escalation of atrocity crimes to the international level.94 Domestic investigations 
typically increase once states are aware of being monitored by the ICC or the ICC has initiated 
preliminary examinations.95 In Africa alone, State Parties that are under investigation experience 
an estimated three times the number of trials per year than African states experiencing atrocity 
crimes that have not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.96 This increase in investigations has been 																																																								
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seen the world over through the ICC’s involvement in Georgia, Kenya, Guinea, South Korea, 
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.97 
Because of the Complementarity Clause, the Office of the Prosecutor is required to verify 
the occurrence of any national level proceedings prior to opening its own investigations and so 
open communications with State Parties is a mandatory role of the OTP.98 In 2012, Kenya was 
pushing to commit to domestic investigations as to avoid ICC involvement in the prosecution 
process. This was both an attempt to secure domestic support from Kenya’s various ethnic 
groups while also demonstrating to senior leaders that the use of violence would not be tolerated 
as a form of retaining power during elections.99 
In addition to prompting and verifying domestic investigations, the OTP has both the 
ability and responsibility to determine the presence of national-level sham investigations and/or 
trials and to verify that proceedings are completed at the standards of the international level. The 
rules of double jeopardy do not apply in the event that the Court determines that domestic 
proceedings were completed under false pretenses.100 Because the state of Libya was unable to 
detain Saif al-Islam Gaddafi for the purposes of trial, the ICC was able to deem the case 
admissible before the Court.101 Both the ongoing armed conflict and the collapse of the central 
government authority have created an absence of rule of law in a number of regions within the 
country, leaving Human Rights Watch to call upon further expansions in the ICC’s investigations 
as it is currently limited to just the events of 2011 dealing with the previous Gaddafi government. 
Human Rights Watch has continued to monitor human rights abuses in the country and have 
declared that strictly “focusing on Gaddafi-era officials is no longer sufficient.”102 Furthermore, 
the preliminary investigations occurring in Georgia involve the non-State Party of Russia and so 
the ICC has been monitoring the investigations being conducted from both sides in regards to the 
armed conflict that occurred in 2008 over South Ossetia to verify the validity of each 
investigation.103 
The Complementarity Clause was designed with the mindset that the Court’s State Parties 
would harmonize their domestic criminal legislation with that of the Rome Statute.104 While it is 
up to the individual states to adapt the criminalization of atrocity crimes, State Parties also 
require a strong rule of law to enforce the apprehension and proceedings of alleged criminals. 
The Philippines passed laws criminalizing torture in 2009 and because of a lack of domestic rule 
of law, torture is still regularly reported with 80% of reported tortures being committed by police 																																																								
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officers.105 The Complementarity Clause essentially allows us to see “a decentralized but 
interactive global system of accountability, in which international tribunals and international 
criminal law interacts with domestic institutions and national and transnational civil society 
groups to help deter future crimes.”106 
 
 Beyond the structure of the Complementarity Clause, the UN Security Council has the 
capacity to warn states of the potential to be referred to the ICC. The possibility of referral has 
the potential to increase the prospects of changed behavior, prevention of crimes, and the 
prevention of further escalation of violence.107 In October 2014, heavy pressure was placed on 
North Korea at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York in regards to the human rights 
violations that are occurring in the country. The UN’s suggestion that North Korea could become 
a referral to the ICC prompted a first-ever meeting of North Korean diplomats and Marzuki 
Darusman, the Human Rights Council special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea.108 
 
 As members of the International Criminal Court’s Assembly of State Parties (ASP), those 
states that have ratified the Rome Statute are bound by obligation to arrest and surrender 
individuals who have been indicted by the ICC if they are found in the territory of a State 
Party.109 Utilizing the transparency of the Court, international attention to those individuals with 
arrest warrants allows for neighboring states to apply diplomatic pressures on the state of the 
wanted national. This may be done through shaming, shunning, or the exclusion of profitable 
relationships both domestic and international and allows for the ability to vocally address crimes 
that may otherwise go ignored.110  This also prevents leaders from relinquishing power but 
seeking asylum with a State Party’s territory.111 
 When a state accepts the jurisdiction of the Court, every one of that State’s nationals is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court if thought responsible for violations of the Rome Statute’s 
crimes. This includes both government and non-governmental personnel to include leadership 
positions and even rebel or paramilitary groups.112 The ICC is unprecedented in its efforts to 
indict, arrest, and try sitting heads-of-state such as Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. While the 
Court has received a significant amount of criticism for indicting al-Bashir, it demonstrates an 
institutional steadfastness in the pursuit of justice and that international law supersedes 
sovereignty when human rights violations are occurring. 
																																																								
105 Amnesty International. Above the Law: Police Torture in the Philippines. December 4, 2014. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/above-law-police-torture-philippines/ (accessed 
July 28, 2015). 
106 Dancy, et al. “The ICC’s Deterrent Impact”; Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How 
Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing the World. New York, New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 2011. 
107 Bensouda, “Setting the Record Straight,” 6. 
108 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015, 408. 
109 United Nations. Article 89, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome: United 
Nations, 1998. 
110 Marshall, “Prevention and Complementarity,” 25; Burke, “The Deterring Effect.” 
111 Chapman & Chaudoin, “Ratification Patterns,” 401. 
112 Ibid, 401. 
		
19	
 As seen to date, senior leaders are the least likely to be held accountable for their crimes 
but in cases where senior leaders have been indicted, their prosecution is most likely to have the 
greatest deterrent effect.113 When it comes to the indictment or issuing of an arrest warrant of 
leaders in weak or failing states, leaders are typically more focused on staying alive and in power 
than being prosecuted or criticized by the ICC or the overall global community.114 Because it has 
been typical that leaders responsible for atrocity crimes most often evade the grip of domestic or 
international justice, the ICC’s Prosecutor has made a continuous effort to prioritize the highest-
level perpetrators with the greatest culpability and the biggest potential for future deterrence.115 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the home of the ICC’s first convict, Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo. Because of the Court’s ability to threaten prosecution, media coverage has 
shown that a number of ex-combatants in the DRC have seen changes in behaviors of rebel 
commanders that are designed to avoid the possibility of any further ICC indictments in areas 
such as Ituri, where the ICC has focused its attention within the DRC so far.116 This fear of the 
ICC has become known as “Lubanga Syndrome” and has created a fear of arrest within the 
Congolese Army.117 
The next case to watch in regards to threats of prosecution includes Palestine since its 
ascension to the ICC. With an ongoing-armed conflict between Palestine and Israel, Israel’s non-
State Party status only protects Israel’s nationals if Israelis commit no further atrocity crimes on 
Palestinian territory. If further atrocity crimes occur, the Court’s mandate may apply to both 
states.118 
Deterrence through Peace Building and Development through Stabilization 
This last section of deterrent efforts discusses deterrence through the use of peace 
building and development towards stabilization and includes the advocacy of peace, justice, and 
accountability.119 According to former Judge Song, attempts at conflict management and peace 
negotiations have been used adjacent to ICC investigations and prosecutions.120 ICC Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda suggested in 2012 that deferring judicial proceedings on the basis of peace and 
security may have unwanted side-effects: “Succumbing to pressure to restrain justice may send 
out a message to perpetrators that arrest warrants can be stayed if only they commit more crimes 
or threaten regional peace and security.”121 In an effort to preserve its impartiality, the OTP 
cannot participate in any peace initiatives. However, it is made clear that any proposed solutions 																																																								
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must be compatible with the Rome Statute if either party involved is a State Party to the Rome 
Statute.122 
Additional efforts at peace building and development come from outside organizations 
that call for non-State Parties to ratify the Rome Statute. Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the American Non-Governmental 
Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court are among a number of NGOs 
supporting the efforts the of the Court and accepting the Court as a new international and judicial 
norm. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) has placed pressure on Ukraine 
to ratify the Rome Statute and to accept full (rather than limited) jurisdiction of the ICC in order 
to “deter grave crimes.”123 The CICC recently reported that Benin, a state that has supported the 
ICC since its inception, has a bill that allows for domestic prosecution of atrocity crimes that has 
been stuck in the president’s office since 2006.124 The CICC gathers public support to place 
pressure on governments such as Benin to make their legislation compatible with the Rome 
Statute ideals. 
An essential part of peace building and the development of stability includes 
strengthening the rule of law. Dancy et al. stated, “When the judicial system is able to 
systematically issue guilty verdicts, repression lessens even more, perhaps because it signals that 
the rule of law is more firmly in place in these countries.” Furthermore, retributive justice against 
former state officials seems to work as intended in the sense that it is typically associated with 
improvements to the same human rights that have been the focus of the Court. 125 The Court 
works persistently to develop and expand policies that are aimed at the improvement, protection, 
and rights of various groups. Currently the Court is working on a policy paper aimed for release 
in 2015 that works to advance the protection and rights of children.126 
 
Lastly, the Court makes significant efforts to advance the empowerment of victims. The 
Court has encouraged the participation of surviving victims in ways beyond just acting as 
witnesses through the implementation of simplistic applications and through increasing the 
exposure of information, training activities in affected communities, and becoming prosecutorial 
actors.127 The ICC’s legal documents expansively codify certain crimes against women and 
ensure that each organ of the Court works to defend the safety, psychological health, dignity, and 
confidentiality of its female victims and witnesses.128 
The ICC has also helped to develop realistic expectations for victimized groups, to 
include expectations around reparations and the Court provides journalistic workshops to 																																																								
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encourage and ensure the accurate portrayal of events and access to media reports.129 One of the 
most elaborate and necessary strategies of the Court has been the implementation of the Trust 
Fund for Victims (TFV), an organ of the Court designed to provide services for victims. Services 
of the TFV include reconstructive surgeries, trauma-based counseling, services for victims of 
sexual violence, and literacy and vocational training. As of 14 Feb 2014, over 40,000 people 
were direct beneficiaries of the Fund.130 The purpose of the TFV is to keep the victims as the 
central focus of judicial proceedings. While paying reparations to individuals may or may not 
provide a deterrent effect, a compensatory mechanism within the Court is a groundbreaking 
development in international law. “Potentially, individual reparations could reduce harm to 
victims, restore individual dignity to assist with reintegration into society, and trigger or support 
a broader process of societal reconciliation.”131 
Challenges & Limitations to Global Deterrence of Atrocity Crimes 
 To begin this section, there are methodological shortcomings in measuring prevention 
and deterrence quantitatively. These include the difficulties in obtaining empirical data through 
comparisons of justice administered and the absence of atrocity crimes. National-level data is 
often easier to obtain than international-level data. We must also bear in mind that atrocity 
crimes are unique in context—while sharing some characteristics, the circumstances, causes, 
historical and political settings are ultimately unique to each individual conflict and an 
understanding of the context is necessary. This makes both empirical data and control 
experiments difficult to obtain and impractical to conduct.132 
  
The Court receives many criticisms, many of which are fair, others of which are 
unfounded based on the fact that the institution is so young and still developing its strategies 
within a field as young as international criminal law. One of the foremost arguments, however, is 
the focus of the Court’s work thus far. Many critiques argue that the ICC is too Sub-Saharan 
African-centric and is biased against Africa.133 While the Court is based in The Hague, 
Netherlands, the majority of the Court’s work has occurred in Africa and so the Court has been 
described as being too Western in nature and too far removed both culturally and geographically 
from the conflicts. The Court’s judicial approach has been criticized for its forceful application 
of Western ideology, however it is the most universally accepted method as it allows for 
democratically negotiated practices, the application of a single standard, and the development of 
precedent. 
While preliminary examinations are occurring outside of the African continent, the only 
cases to make it to investigation and trial stages are those from Africa. Because of this, both the 																																																								
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Court and the OTP has received accusations of politicization.134 In response to this, Dancy and 
Montal indicate “recent ICC history suggests that the Judges are much harder to portray as 
politically motivated than the Prosecutor, who has been accused of an anti-African bias by some 
and of being too lenient to governments by others.”135 
What is important here is that the majority of the criticisms come from state governments 
within Africa, receiving criticisms from both autocratic governments such as Sudan and 
democratically elected governments such as South Africa and Kenya.136 However, African states 
are not the only ones to question the Court’s African-centric focus and there appears to be a 
general consensus that the ICC needs to take “a road out of Africa” by accepting other cases that 
will begin to appease those who feel the ICC is targeting Africa. 
A large problem with the idea that the ICC is biased against Africa is that the arguments 
have been both too simplistic and too misleading to fully understand the complexity of the 
relationships with African states. Many state governments denouncing the Court have 
condemned the ICC as being neo-colonial, racist, and even went so far as to describe it as a “race 
hunting” institution, resonating with various constituencies for political and historical reasons.137 
In response, the ICC has been too simplistic in its responses to such accusations by 
explaining in simplistic terms that the Court is not a court against Africa but a court for Africa. 
Many observers and critics of the Court have been fruitless in assessing and dissecting the 
relationship of the Court and Africa and “teasing out its political complexities.” 138 Africa’s 
international presence struggles with its various goals to include developing national and 
international human rights norms, the expansion and security of its international influence, deep-
rooted anti-colonial sentiments, and the strong authoritarian presence residual in many African 
countries that both undermine these goals and have good reason to fear further progression of 
these goals and new norms.139 
Further pertaining to accusations of politicization, it is a small group of mostly Western 
states that possess the most influence on the budget, which can impact the choice of what 
situations to investigate.140 David Bosco explains “the political implications of case selection are 
a far greater obstacle for the ICC than the predecessor ad hoc tribunals.”141 These various 
criticisms, however, do not take into account that five of the nine active investigations were 
state-referrals to the ICC, and two of the other four were referrals made to the Court by the UN 
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Security Council. Nor is there a single one of these cases that should not have been opened.142 
The Central African Republic, who already has two separate investigations underway, is 
demonstrating further need by creating an additional hybrid court to work in cooperation with the 
ICC for more expeditious results.143 
Essentially, Aurelia Frick argues that the only way to eliminate criticisms of case 
selection and an African bias within the Court is for all non-State Parties to ratify the Rome 
Statute and allow full universal jurisdiction. Until then, only the UN Security Council receives 
the full responsibility to end impunity through its ability to refer non-State Parties in violation of 
Rome Statute crimes to the ICC.144 For all the places that the global community wishes to see 
intervention and accountability (i.e. Syria, North Korea, Burma/Myanmar), the ICC does not 
have jurisdiction. Only through the UN Security Council can the ICC gain jurisdiction to such 
places; this is a structural problem, not a choice of the Court.145 The Court does indeed 
experience geographical limitations of jurisdiction. There is an absence of many states that are 
experiencing ongoing internal conflict but it is necessary to recognize that the ICC has begun 
preliminary examinations and investigations in some of them such as Afghanistan, Colombia, the 
Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.146 
 
The International Criminal Court faces other challenges, such as the issue of the 
punishment of offenders of Rome Statute crimes.147 Most of those who have been indicted by the 
ICC have not been arrested and are not yet facing trial. 148 So far, only a small number of cases 
have been completed yet despite the variety of outcomes, have been beneficial to the Court in 
terms of establishing and developing procedures. 
In terms of convictions, there is a large dissatisfaction with the Court’s sentencing 
structure. Currently, the Court’s structure allows for a maximum sentence of 35 years with life 
sentences being reserved if “justified by the extreme gravity of the crime.”149 This is not an ideal 
structure but the lack of a blanket life sentence does offer incentive for alleged perpetrators to 
cooperate with the Court. However, the punishment of perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity is especially low as compared to a domestic jurisdictions’ punishment 
of rape, homicide, and/or torture. Critics argue that the Court’s sentencing structure is too lenient 
to be considered retributive justice and that judges rely heavily on mitigating factors that 																																																								
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influence sentencing objectives such as deterrence or restorative justice. 150 However, the 
creation of deterrence requires the certainty of swift and fitting punishment for crimes as they 
occur and this ability is largely absent in international law.151 
The ICC also lacks any type of rehabilitative measures for those it convicts. 
“Rehabilitation has never been significant in determining a sentence before an international 
criminal tribunal; rather, retribution and deterrence are the primary sentencing rationales cited in 
international criminal jurisprudence.”152 There has never been a shortage of desire to punish 
perpetrators but many trials come at the cost of destroying victims’ credibility.153 
 
Another challenge the Court faces is the ongoing debate of how to approach the 
prosecution of a political leader: sometimes leaders facing threats of prosecution prolong conflict 
in order to keep themselves in power whereas immunity may provide the initiative and incentive 
to end further crimes, leading back to the “peace vs. justice” debate once more.154 Some scholars 
argue that the Court may be responsible for the exacerbation of humanitarian atrocities by 
prosecuting those individuals whose political cooperation is necessary to conducting successful 
peace negotiations in weak or failed states.155 Examples of this include both Sudan and Libya 
where some NATO allies suggest that exile might produce more expedient ends to the conflicts 
than arrest warrants.156 However, this suggestion is based on an optimistic belief that the leaders 
of these states would work legitimately to complete peace negotiations. 
This debate is an increasingly important consideration as the global community has 
pushed for the end of conflicts through peace negotiations and soft-power tactics rather than 
military intervention.157 The problem with relying solely on peace negotiations and diplomacy is 
that efforts require cooperation where negotiations may not necessarily be effective and 
participants may not always be sincere yet tactics such as sanctions often push criminals closer 
together.158 Tribunals are now used, whether correctly or incorrectly, as a substitute for using 
force as a way to end atrocity crimes.159 
 
Arguably, the largest limitation of the Court comes from its lack of resources and 
universal credibility.160 When it comes to resources, the lack of an enforcement team is a major 																																																								
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burden on the Court because it requires that all indictments and arrest warrants be fulfilled by the 
voluntary surrender or release of wanted nationals.161 Comparing this international court to 
national level courts is a poor association for the fact that the ICC does not possess the same 
enforcement tools as national courts.162 This then requires the Court to work closely with 
international organizations and various institutions to both promote similar interests and respect 
for the Court’s mandate. The ICC relies heavily upon both State and non-State Parties to 
cooperate and submit nationals if within the State’s territory. This has been a particularly 
difficult venture in places such as Sudan, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire.163 As of the time of writing, 
twelve arrest warrants still remain active but this remains a failure of the Assembly of State 
Parties rather than of the Court itself.164 It is expected that the International Criminal Court act as 
a deterrent force to prevent further atrocity crimes but the full extent of the deterrent impact is 
partially reliant on the cooperation and capability of strong states to support the Court.165 
Among the lack of resources includes the lack of political, diplomatic, and financial 
support for the Court to carry out its mandate as originally intended.166Nick Grono stated, “One 
of the main challenges for international policymakers in their efforts to resolve conflicts or 
reduce human rights abuses is that they often lack effective incentives or sanctions (diplomatic, 
legal, military, or economic) of sufficient credibility to influence the calculations of the warring 
parties.” Grono further explains that international policymakers assume that leaders, whether 
government or rebel, wish to maintain or attain access to domestic power and that leaders do so 
through rational, goal-oriented decision-making processes. However, government leaders assume 
culpability for the crimes committed under their command, which then poses a threat to the 
power they have achieved which ideally should deter the use of atrocity crimes if the leader 
wishes to maintain power. 167 
The Court experiences a lack of full cooperation from State Parties as well. While State 
Party cooperation is typically positive, it falls short of expectations in a number of key areas: the 
execution of arrest warrants, the facilitation of access to evidence and witnesses, and witness 
protection.168 These are all important functions to maintain effectively if the Court is to be 
expected to complete full proceedings quickly, effectively, and in line with the Court’s mandate. 
 
The independent relationship of the ICC and the UN Security Council has also seen 
considerable strain due to its lack of full support. Thus far, only two cases have made it through 
the Security Council to a successful referral to the ICC, as seen in the cases of Sudan and Libya. 
In the ten years since the Darfur referral, six arrest warrants have been issued and only one 
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arrest. Despite being referred to the Court by the Security Council, Sudan still continues to reject 
the jurisdiction of the Court.169 
United Nations Member States have not been cooperative in assisting with or executing 
arrest warrants despite the UN Security Council being the one to refer the cases of Darfur and 
Libya. Others question the inconsistency of the UN’s referral of cases, especially regarding the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, where the UN directly undermines the Court’s legitimacy. 
Referrals involve specific people rather than Carte blanch access to any alleged perpetrators 
within a state; in the referrals it has made, the Security Council has determined who to 
investigate—a task typically left to the OTP—begging the question of why some alleged 
criminals are chosen and why others are not. Referring back to the General Assembly’s lack of 
cooperation, each referral made to the Court is done through a resolution adopted by the Security 
Council, suggesting that all UN Member Parties are responsible for abiding by the resolution, not 
just State Parties of the ICC. 170 
An additional problem with the ICC/UN Security Council relationship is that the Court 
receives no additional funding if cases are referred by the Security Council, allowing the 
financial burden to fall to the Assembly of State Parties, even when the situation is of a non-State 
Party. The UN’s funding decisions go through the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly as 
so the Security Council has no direct access to or influence on funding.171 Lead ICC Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda publicly announced the OTP’s decision to hibernate the ICC’s investigation in 
Sudan due to the lack of cooperation and enforcement by the UN Security Council and the Libya 
situation continues to descend out of control as resources are too scarce to allow focus.172 
 
Funding is one of the largest constraints on the ICC’s mandate, requiring that the Court 
be particularly strategic in determining which cases to pursue and which to defer to national-
level judiciaries.173 When Prosecutor Bensouda announced the hibernation of the Darfur case in 
December 2014 and explained that she would “shift resources to other urgent cases,” this 
statement reflected both the underwhelming resources made available to the ICC as well as the 
lack of commitment by the UN Security Council to follow through on the steps necessary to 
affect any change.174 
In May 2014, the UN Security Council had addressed the possibility of referring the 
Syria case to the ICC but was vetoed by both Russia and China, both of whom have interests in 
Syria. Mariana Rodríguez-Pareja and Salvador Herenica-Carrasco suggest that perhaps the veto 
of Syria was good for the Court, indicating that accepting the case at this level of the Court’s 
international status would have weakened the international justice system due to inadequate 
resources, the lack of political support, and it would have financially burdened the ICC beyond 
its existing capacity in an effort to carry out suitable investigations and arrests.175 
Even the surrender of Dominic Ongwen in January 2015 required the shifting and re-
prioritizing of prosecutorial and investigative activities as well as the re-deployment of resources 																																																								
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at the expense of other cases. This was done in order to meet judicial deadlines and to be ready 
for the confirmation of charges; while the ICC is closer to achieving some justice in Uganda, it 
meant the temporary scaling-back of time, effort, and resources on other cases.176 
Funding constraints even come from within the Assembly of State Parties (ASP). 
Between 2009 and 2011, a number of the highest-contributing State Parties requested zero 
growth in the annual budget contributions despite a significant growth in the Court’s activities.177 
Bensouda has even had to scale back resources for the ongoing crimes occurring in Libya in 
order to allow the progress of other situations to become trial ready. Resource constraints have 
been the cause of holding back overdue progress in Côte d’Ivoire where investigations are 
needed to determine responsibility for the 2010-2011 election violence. The lack of equal 
headway on all situations ends up creating further criticisms for the Court. This includes equal 
progress within the same case, where the Court was critiqued for making progress on the Laurent 
Gbagbo case in Côte d’Ivoire in 2014 while lacking in development in the allegations of crimes 
committed by pro-Ouatara forces.178 
The budget going forward needs to be determined based on a common ASP idea of what 
the Court should be accomplishing at optimal capacity where its current method is designing a 
budget with a cap, not knowing the Court’s full capabilities. This would require further 
negotiations and compromises between the Court itself and the ASP.179 
As Héctor Olásolo put it, “The fact that the Rome Statute is a legislative act of the State 
Parties, and not of the international community, does not mean that the Rome Statute does not 
have an authentic universal aspiration and that in the future it cannot turn into an authentic 
legislative act of the international community.”180 
 
In addition to lacking political, diplomatic, and financial support, the Court is still 
working to establish its legitimacy despite being operational for 13 years. Beyond needing help 
from State Parties in enforcing the Court’s activities, the Court relies on State Parties to solidify 
its role within international law as well as the legitimacy and enforcement of international 
criminal law. Some State Parties are lacking in providing support to the Court, allowing it to 
become an institution that “moves from one breaking-point of legitimacy to another” and being a 
member of the “crisis industry.”181 Some State Parties even allow wanted individuals to roam 
freely from state to state without legitimate worry of being apprehended, such as with the case of 
Omar al-Bashir, who recently visited South Africa but was allowed to escape and return to Sudan 
prior to the passing of any legislation that might legally force South Africa to execute the arrest 
warrant and surrender al-Bashir to The Hague.182 
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Since the issuing of his arrest warrant in 2009, al-Bashir has been allowed to travel to 17 
UN Member States where he has not been detained based on his evasion of enforcement officials 
and the apprehension of  state governments to be responsible for arresting a sitting head-of-
state.183 This reasoning undermines the ICC and its goal of deterrence and creates an undesired 
culture that past and current heads-of-state are immune to the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Besides states’ roles in impacting the Court’s legitimacy, the Court receives additional 
criticisms because of the existing length and inefficiency of trials. In order to combat this, the 
OTP is two years into implementing strategies from the current three-year Strategic Plan and the 
Registry is working diligently to streamline and reorganize many aspects of the Registry Office, 
as it is responsible for a large portion of the Court’s operations.184 Also worth considering are 
limitations in the Court’s current approach of seeking out only individuals with alleged criminal 
responsibility in that this eliminates any potential of seeking out those responsible for 
committing atrocity crimes as part of a corporation, state, or international organization.185 
 
Defiance is currently a large obstacle for the ICC to overcome. First off, we have to 
realize that defiance is enabled through “the silence of the majority, the acquiescence of the 
bystander, and the complicity of those neighbors who avert their gaze.”186 Other forms of 
defiance include the obstruction of investigations and judicial proceedings, lack of Rome Statute 
ratification by world superpowers, and the reluctance or non-cooperation of both State and non-
State Parties. 
Two primary examples are given in the matter of defiance through obstruction of 
investigations and judicial proceedings, beginning with the case of Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir. In 2007, the ICC indicted high-ranking Sudanese officials Ahmad Harun and Ali 
Kushayb and al-Bashir’s response was to promote Harun to the position of Minister of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan. Al-Bashir’s own indictment came in 2009 where his reaction to 
the ICC was, “You can eat it.”187 Kenya, CAR, Chad, and South Africa have all allowed al-
Bashir to travel freely into their territories since his arrest warrant was issued in March 2009.188 
Since then, he has continued to defy the arrest warrant and the UN Security Council’s call to end 
the violence occurring in Darfur. By 2012, al-Bashir had expelled 13 international aid agencies 
including Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam as well as shutting down domestic human rights 
groups.189 
Second, Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya utilized a close election win to garner the ability to 
obstruct the investigations occurring in Kenya, successfully promoting the ICC to drop the case 
against him as of 5 December 2014. The Court’s inability to provide the necessary level of 
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witness protection resulted in witness tampering that ultimately and adversely undermined the 
efforts of the Court.190 
The fact that three of the five Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council have 
not signed the Rome Statute acts as a form of defiance meant to undermine the Court in its 
current statue, referring to the U.S., Russia, and China. As mentioned before, Russia and China 
have used their veto power to keep Syria outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction despite being endorsed 
by 65 countries. The issue of addressing Syria has reached the Security Council each year since 
2011 and has been vetoed each time.191 Over 100 NGOs have put pressure on the UN Security 
Council to refer Syria to the ICC and 13 of the 15 Security Council voted in favor of an ICC 
referral.192 In spite its veto, China has called for “political solutions” in Syria, Sudan, and South 
Sudan but has played a role in prolonging the occurrence of atrocity crimes in all three states and 
is repetitively called to address its own human right violations.193 
Many UN Member States have also been reluctant to heed the resolutions passed by the 
UN Security Council regarding referrals.194 This has been most evident in the Darfur case where 
the Court has received little cooperation despite the number of African countries that are State 
Parties to the Rome Statute and their supposed commitment to ending the impunity of those 
responsible for atrocity crimes.195 
Recent years have shown a growing reluctance to cooperate with the Court, largely by an 
increasing number of African leaders.196 This includes the hesitancy of South Africa to detain 
Omar al-Bashir following the African Union leadership summit that occurred in June 2015, 
where he was ultimately allowed to return to Sudan.197In June 2014, South Africa garnered 
support for “an amendment to a protocol creating an African Court that provides immunity from 
prosecution for serving heads-of-state and senior government officials, including war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.”198 The African Union has undergone a major 
ideological change from originally supporting full African ratification of the Rome Statute to 
now actively undermining the Court and considering withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction.199 
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The African country of Senegal was the first country to ratify the Rome Statute but now 
calls on State Parties not to cooperate with the Court.200 As previously stated, the conflicting 
agendas amongst the African leadership has led to a sort of political cognitive dissonance as the 
continent builds democratic support of human rights standards in some regions while 
maintaining high levels of authoritarianism and human rights abuses in other regions. While the 
continent attempts to speak collectively with an influential and authoritative voice, it is a 
continent ripe with division.201 
 
We must also look at how patterns of opportunity affect the potential of perpetration as 
those who commit atrocity crimes in weak or failing states do so because of more opportunity to 
do so, not necessarily more inclination.202 As Mary Robinson describes,  
Where domestic law and order has broken down, individuals may feel that they can 
commit even the most atrocious crimes without fear of legal sanction. When this 
happens, there is an urgent need to re-establish the principle of individual responsibility 
for crimes. If serious human rights violations are not addressed and a climate of impunity 
is permitted to continue, then the effect will be to stoke the fires of long-term social 
conflict. Where a community splits along religious or ethnic lines, such conflict can vent 
itself through cycles of vengeance over decades, and even centuries.203 
 
 Most theories in criminology assume that persons committing atrocity crimes are rational 
decision-makers that base their decisions on a cost-benefit analysis that can be predictable yet 
this predominant theory does not explain why some offenders may not respond in the ways 
expected when threatened with international sanctions. Tom Buitelaar of the Hague Institute for 
Global Justice states that “deterrence is achieved when the potential offender perceives the 
disincentive of the legal sanction threat to be so strong that it outweighs the incentives of the 
crime under consideration.”204 Genocidal leaders have in many cases flaunted their crimes 
openly, undeterred by international reactions, which they believe will vary from deliberate 
blindness (which is best case scenario from their perspective) to diplomatic scorn (seen as worst 
case scenario).205 Genocidal behavior can be understood in simplistic terms as a means to 
achieve goals seen as desirable or to avoid situations seen as undesirable.206 
 Nick Grono suggests that there is a range of considerations for potential perpetrators to 
weigh. These include the possibility of internal opposition, financial consequences, the 
probability of military success, any international disapproval shy of prosecutions, and the 																																																								
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possibility of sanctions or other coercive measures. However, there is substantial evidence to 
suggest that national leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the chance of ICC prosecution 
if found to be in violation of any Rome Statute Crimes. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that awareness of the ICC and its reaches may prevent the occurrence of crimes 
included in the Rome Statute. It is also likely that the ICC may be better equipped to suppress the 
use of atrocity crimes if the leader allegedly responsible for the crimes does not feel that his or 
her life is being threatened but this also requires that leaders and high-ranking officials have an 
appropriate and accurate understanding of international relations, the international legal system, 
and international criminal liability in order for them to fully weigh their strategic options. One 
also has to contextualize the regime type in its attempt to predict an outcome, as smaller ruling 
parties are typically more vulnerable to outside pressures like economic sanctions.207 It is also 
more likely for violence to occur in a state if that state (or one of its immediate neighbors) has 
experienced conflict in the recent past.208 
 
 The final category of limitation to be discussed in this paper is that of the likelihood of 
gender-based violence reaching the ICC. So far, sexual and gender crimes are often the crimes 
least likely to reach the Court and for a number of reasons.209 First of all, mid- to lower-level 
perpetrators are most likely to commit gender-based crimes. The first high-level official to be 
apprehended based on sexual violence was Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Central African Republic as 
his arrest warrant included charges of rape.210  
Second, in investigative terms, there is a “golden hour” that is ideal for evidence 
collection and as rape and sexual violence are both underreported and often times reported after a 
significant amount of time has passed, the collection of physical evidence can be extremely 
challenging.211Third, sexual violence happens so frequently under the guise of war because it is 
an inexpensive and readily available weapon of war. Unfortunately, there are even cases of rape 
reported against UN Peacekeepers, those sent to establish and maintain peaceful interactions 
between conflicting groups.212 
Deterrence of sexual and gender-based violence is difficult to accomplish because there is 
low probability of perpetrators being punished. Cumulative charges are easier to prove but are 
deemed unfair to the Defense teams because each reported instance requires its own set of 
evidence. Because of this, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s cumulative charge was dropped.213 The lack of 																																																								
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justice that occurs on behalf of these crimes enables the discrimination and marginalization of 
these victims, which may at times be the exact intent of committing these crimes as rape is at 
times used for the purposes of humiliating and/or dishonoring the victims.214 Prosecutor 
Bensouda maintains a steadfast role in applying charges of sexual- and gender-based violence to 
the majority of current cases as they apply in an attempt to end the culture of impunity around 
such crimes. She has also noted that the OTP has been collaborating with national systems to 
advance their ability to handle these crimes domestically.215 
Conclusion 
 The International Criminal Court has seen some truly great successes while also being 
burdened by a great number of limitations, challenges, and critiques. The ICC has gone to great 
lengths to collaborate with as many officials, leaders, civilians, and victims as it can in order to 
promote the Court’s mission as well as to attempt to offer alternative means for conflict 
resolution rather than the use of brutal force that result in atrocity crimes. 
While prevention itself cannot be measured empirically in the case of the ICC, we can 
certainly look at what empirical data we do have and use that to formulate both realistic 
expectations and conclusions about the Court. Between 1 November 2013 and 31 October 2014, 
the OTP received 579 communications relating to Article 15 of the Rome Statute. Of those 579 
communications, 462 were deemed to be outside of the Court’s jurisdiction, 44 merited further 
analysis, 49 were linked to already active situations being analyzed by the Court, and 24 were 
connected to an already active investigation or prosecution.216 As of 19 November 2014, 11,239 
communications have reached the Court to date since July 2002, undeniably signifying that the 
Court is being utilized.217 With the annual numbers being completed thus far only through 2014, 
we can see that the Court maintained its busiest year in terms of trials with 6 different cases 
throughout, 4 different situations reaching the trial stage, 22 cases being monitored or 
investigated over 9 different situations, and 9 additional situations receiving preliminary 
examinations. 218 
 Using the same date range (1 November 2013 to 31 October 2014), the ICC completed 
three preliminary examinations. The preliminary examination in CAR was escalated to a full-
scale investigation referred to as CAR II. Both the examinations in the Republic of Korea and the 
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia were deemed to have not met the 
required criteria to escalate the situations to investigations under Article 53(1) of the Rome 
Statute.219 Amongst the closing of three examinations was the opening/re-opening of two cases 
for examination. The ICC opened examinations in Ukraine and re-opened its examination in Iraq 
based on the receipt of new evidence. The OTP has also prioritized seeking information from 
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national-level proceedings to ascertain that thorough investigations and prosecutions of gender-
based violence are occurring domestically.220 
 
 Methodologically, it can be very easy to pick out the cases where deterrence and 
prevention have not occurred and it is much more challenging to establish where it has worked. 
Deterrence of atrocity crimes can manifest itself in a number of ways and often depends on 
successful mediations and conflict prevention, which may essentially only appear as the absence 
of conflict.221 This makes it difficult for some to believe that deterrence should be part of the 
Court’s explicit mandate.222 Some scholars have suggested that the Court focus more on 
completing prosecutions and trials efficiently and to do so more to the expectations of the global 
community; by establishing its capacity to finish cases and finish them well, deterrence will be a 
consequence.223 
 It is of great importance, however, that both the ICC’s supporters and critics specify with 
clarity what is expected of the Court, which is to “deter a significant crime category within its 
jurisdiction.”224 Some deterrence is of course possible but it is unrealistic to believe that the ICC 
is capable of preventing all atrocity crimes everywhere as the Court was not built upon this 
expectation. Part of the problem with the current expectations of the Court’s deterrent impact 
stem from a belief that the Court may work as a relatively “cheap” instrument in handling 
conflicts as opposed to more robust interventions such as the use of military force.225 Philipp 
Kastner describes the dangers of unrealistic expectations as such: 
The Court is seen to have failed because supporters inflate hopes and expectations about 
the Court’s usefulness as a conflict management tool. This is all the more problematic 
because the short-term failure of justice to deliver an end to hostilities might decrease 
perceptions about the independent value of justice in the long term.226 
 
 We must recognize that while the Court has failed in its efforts at deterrence in some 
circumstances, it does not mean the Court does not have a deterrent effect or cannot improve as 
time goes by and lessons are learned. Observers have made the mistake of focusing too much on 
“specific deterrence,” a belief that the threat of prosecution may stop leaders who have already 
committed Rome Statute crimes from committing them again in the future. While this is an ideal 
outcome, the more likely outcome is that threatening leaders who are actively committing such 
crimes may only escalate the intensity of the crimes as a tactic of self-preservation to remain in 
power. This is most clearly seen in the case of Omar al-Bashir whose defiance since the 2009 
issuing of his arrest warrant has escalated human rights abuses in Sudan.227 																																																								
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 Unfortunately, the ICC’s deterrent effect will always be “hostage to the immediate 
domestic context” as each conflict is once again unique in its circumstances and causes and 
because the desires and approaches of each leader varies. However, the worldwide knowledge of 
the ICC is growing and its goals and norms are becoming more deeply entrenched and supported 
as the global community shifts to a more moralistic stance on human rights. Both government 
leaders and rebel leaders are becoming more aware of the work the Court is doing and are 
recognizing the very real possibility of appearing before the Court. Considering the number of 
high-profile leaders that have been indicted, arrested, or convicted, it has become a worthy 
consideration for leaders when deciding to either “crush a growing opposition with violence, or 
negotiate, or address the underlying grievances.”228 Rather than fight his conviction through the 
appeals process, the DRC’s Germaine Katanga accepted the ICC’s judgment and issued an 
apology to his victims.229 
 Effective deterrence relies upon both normative pressures and material punishment.230 
The ICC is able to utilize prosecutions to contribute to developing culpability norms that deter 
atrocity crimes by making them condemnable by the status quo of international standards and 
more costly for perpetrators in terms of relationships and economics.231 With prosecutions of 
human rights violators comes the improvement of human rights standards, which has the added 
benefit of acting as a deterrent force that goes beyond just the state in question.232 
 However, a deterrent effect is only reachable if the ICC is confident that it has the 
necessary political, financial, and legal support from the international community that allows for 
the Court to fulfill its mandate in effective and efficient ways.233 This process works on a 
cyclical basis, as deterrence is also dependent on successful prosecutions, meaning the 
administration of international justice is dependent on both the ICC and support from and 
interaction with the international community. 
 
The fact of the matter is that impunity fuels conflict.234 Rather than looking solely at 
“specific deterrence” the ICC needs to shift its focus to balance longer-term deterrence goals in 
order to prevent future generations from utilizing atrocity crimes for strategic purposes.235 
Beyond this, it needs to be recognized that deterrence is only one facet of the ICC’s overall 
goals—“justice for victims and reconciliation for war-torn countries are among its many 
priorities.”236 International criminal justice is largely cost-effective when compared to 
tremendously expensive campaigns that aim to alter the deep structural causes of human rights 
violations, which often include poverty, civil war, inequality, and corruption.237  For as valiant as 
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many of those efforts are, they are often ineffective and require new strategies for how to address 





































































































Republic of Korea 
Republic of Moldova 
Romania 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
















The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
Timor-Leste 













Appendix II – Transcribed Interview with Dr. Maarten van 
Munsterii 
1 June 2015 
Note: Dr. van Munster’s expertise lies primarily in transitional justice in Rwanda, focusing 
mainly on the gacaca courts specific to the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. He specifically 
stated that his expertise does not include the International Criminal Court. 
 
The first question I have, I was reading a presentation that President Song had done in 
2013 and he had mentioned that atrocity prevention was a goal of the ICC. I’m wondering 
if you think that that’s something that should be something the ICC is trying to attain and 
is that even a realistic goal? 
I think in the first part of your question, “should it be a goal of the ICC,” I think when it was 
created it was basically created in the aftermath of the atrocities in Rwanda and in the Balkans 
and the idea of at least the NGOs, civil society and other actors that were involved in creating the 
ICC was definitely to do so—to have this institution, to prevent future atrocities. You need some 
sort of mechanism that could have that effect. If you ask me, “should it have that as a goal”—
what do you mean, legally in the Statute or just in general? 
 
Should the institution, whether formally or informally, work to try to prevent atrocities? 
Should that be within its mandate to try to prevent crimes or should it just handle the 
aftermath? 
While I think the latter. It should be a legal institution that deals with atrocities and prosecutes 
the suspects of these atrocities and the most responsible for the most serious crimes—the top 
layer of the people involved. And then an effect of that—the prosecutions—could be deterrence. 
Whether it actually does, maybe that’s one of your later questions. That's a difficult one of 
course. I don’t think it should be a specific goal of the institution per se.  
 
The Court itself has come under criticisms including lack of legitimacy and credibility. Do 
you have any ideas as far as how the Court can establish itself in terms of greater 
legitimacy within the realm of international law and international justice? 
Yeah, you’re hinting at the bias on Africa? 
 
There has definitely been the critique that it has been very Sub-Saharan African-centric 
but even a lot of the Western nations or the U.S, Russia, China—those that have not 
ratified the Rome Statute—tend to undermine the authority and the legitimacy of the 
Court when it suits them. In your opinion, I’m wondering if there’s anything the Court can 
do to further establish or build its legitimacy as an international legal institution? 
Yeah, I think the only thing it can do—because it’s not under the influence of the Court to 
directly influence its own membership—it’s a member-based organization so the Member States, 
the Parties of the ICC—they make the Court and if some state is not a part of it, it’s nothing the 
Court can influence. I think the only way it can influence something is by doing its work very 
well and showing through its judgments and through its approach. Mainly I think the OTP should 
be very good in the sense that it clearly explains why it takes it positions and what the legal 
grounds are for prosecuting or not prosecuting. And if it does that well, that could help in 
convincing other Member States who are a bit reluctant perhaps, to understand what positions or 
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what direction the Court will take and convince these States to participate. That’s about it, I 
think. There’s not a lot more it can do. 
Maybe people from around the Court, perhaps a judge, can convince other states to join more 
actively through political mechanisms or through diplomatic norms. 
 
Because Moreno-Ocampo had been the Prosecutor for nine years, how did his tenure 
position the ICC for its future endeavors? Did he put the Court at an advantage or a 
disadvantage? 
That’s a difficult one because he was quite a flamboyant figure so in a way I think that’s good 
because it puts the ICC on the map and in that sense didn’t go by unnoticed by most of the 
documentaries and the famous people that went to the Court as well. On the other hand I think he 
was maybe a bit too much of a politician and not so much a prosecutor in a certain way with 
some of the things he said in press conferences were…”activistic” almost. And that harmed the 
institution I think. I think a legal institution has more strength if it acts in a way a bit boring—
being led by evidence, being led by the law and not too much by political motives. I’m not 
saying that he had a political agenda but sometimes he came across as a bit too flamboyant and a 
bit too political in that sense. Like the things he said about Bashir for example. 
 
How do you see criticisms that say the ICC is either losing support, could fail, or become 
obsolete? For instance, the Central African Republic is going through the UN to set up an 
additional ad hoc court, even despite the fact that the ICC is already established. 
Well I don't have a crystal ball so I don’t know whether it will become obsolete but it’s quite 
clear that it’s facing a lot of difficulties. And how that will develop, no one really knows. And 
even the African Union I think adopted a resolution on the addition of the special court. Those 
are sort of empirical indications that they are losing support or at least that there are some 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are less enthusiastic than they used to be when the ICC started 
and of course the fact that heads of state were prosecuted, like in Sub-Saharan Africa like with 
Kenyatta, the President of Kenya and Omar al-Bashir, the President from Sudan. That didn’t help 
but I have to say in defense of the ICC here that it’s also a bit, maybe inevitable, that this 
happens because if your objective is to prosecute the most responsible for the most serious 
crimes, then you will end up with top leading officials and it’s also not a secret that most of the 
internal warfare and civil wars and so on, they are on the African continent and very often one of 
the leaders of the government is involved and indicted for these crimes and it’s not a surprise that 
people who are indicted become defensive and also try to undermine the legitimacy of the Court. 
So maybe it’s already implicitly very difficult to do it right and to not lose legitimacy in that 
sense. I think to some extent, it did lose some legitimacy but impossible not to lose this 
legitimacy. 
 
Prosecutor Bensouda has dismissed the Darfur case because of lack of support from the 
UN. How do you think that affects the status or the perception of the ICC? 
She called it a “hibernation” I think and the case is basically hibernating so the arrest warrants 
are still there but there’s no progress basically. That definitely impacts the status of the ICC 
because when they started out, the idea that heads of state or other suspects of these kinds of 
crimes—they cannot travel anymore and are confined to their own country—and now it’s 
happened that [Bashir] has traveled to other countries and other ICC Member States. That also 
weakens of course the idea of deterrence and also maybe the legitimacy of the Court. Again, this 
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is also something that has to do with lack of having a police force or basically a strong-arm 
support of the law. So yes, to answer your question I think it does weaken the position of the ICC 
unfortunately. 
 
Do you think it affects the situation in Darfur directly? 
Initially, I think it could have had some impact on Bashir himself and could have moderated his 
behavior a little bit or that of the administration. I think at this point it’s probably not so much 
the case anymore. I think what he also did in his administration was testing the waters to see 
what happened and reality showed that nothing really happened and that also gives the leader the 
feeling that it’s more or less safe. 
 
More than half the world’s population is not protected under the ICC’s jurisdiction. There 
are 123 States that have joined but because of the majorly-population countries such as the 
U.S., Russia, China, and India, there are so many people that are not protected by the 
jurisdiction. What need to happen in order to increase the participation and cooperation of 
states that have so far been reluctant and/or defiant of the Court? 
All it can do is do its work very well, be transparent and try to show that there’s no political 
agenda as much as possible. Though that’s very hard. We know through other examples—the 
Yugoslavia Courts [ICTY] for example—the Prosecutor was also actively looking for 
perpetrators on the other side to balance the books a little bit. And I think maybe that’s the key 
problem—that the ICC is a legal institution and it tries to stay away from politics but that’s more 
or less impossible. If you prosecute these kinds of crimes you will be drawn into a political game 
where people will accuse of all kinds of biases and so on. And the only thing I think you can do 
is do your work as transparently as possible and objectively as possible as far as is feasible. I 
think that would be the greatest help to the Court to do these things in a good way. And of course 
you need to communicate and talk about it. Member States that are on board should also reach 
out to others and show what the Court is doing. And that could slowly, gradually improve the 
situation. 
 
You’ve worked so closely with the gacacas, which are very culturally specific to Rwanda’s 
perception of justice. Do you feel the ICC has maintained an appropriate level of cultural 
sensitivity and relevance in its investigations and proceedings? 
I do not know enough to answer that specifically. I do know that at the start, the LRA case in 
Uganda, that they sent very young prosecutors, some of them even placement students or at least 
very young and recently graduated from Western countries. They sent them to Uganda and had 
them do all sorts of interviews to collect evidence with victims and family members of victims. 
And apparently that was not always the best approach because if you say someone from say, law 
school in The Netherlands or somewhere else who’s 23 or 22 to interview someone who was the 
victim of a rape in an African village, that’s maybe not the best way to do it. I’m not sure if it’s 
still going like that—I don’t think so. They learned from those criticisms and feedback that was 
given to them. But how do you do it right? It’s difficult to gain entry to countries, get access to 
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The preamble of the Rome Statute specifically mentions contributing to the prevention of 
atrocity crimes through ending impunity of perpetrators. This concept has been reinforced 
through statements by [Prosecutor] Moreno-Ocampo and [former] President Song. So first 
I’d like to determine, should prevention of atrocity crimes be an explicit goal of the Court? 
And is this a realistic goal? 
Maybe before I kick off, I’ll give the usual reservation that academics make—I don’t consider 
myself to be a real expert on this issue on goals of international criminal justice but at the same 
time, I’ve been in the field for quite a long time focusing on other issues but I think I do have 
some thoughts on this. 
I think, and this goals for many of the other goals as well, as to international criminal justice that 
this might be a bit dangerous to set such far-reaching, broad goals and I think we’ve seen that 
now. Everyone sees it happening that some of the other goals are difficult to meet and in 
particular this one—prevention. I can see politically why they argue it but in actual practice it 
might be not so wise to do it after all. It might be much more wiser to say ‘we hold people 
accountable for what they did. Period. That’s it. And don’t bother us with possible negative 
effects that we can have or the fact that we don’t meet up to certain other goals. What we do is 
hold people accountable.’ That would, in retrospect, have been the best but at the same time I can 
imagine that politically you want money, all kinds of parties to support your project, and then it 
makes much more sense to formulate broader goals. And if I just may add to that, I think it’s 
already quite—it might be interesting to look at that if you compare ICC to ICTY where ICTY 
had an explicit goal of reconciliation, ICC already ditched that goal because I think that ICTY 
had been critiqued a lot and that it might have had a contrary effect of reconciliation. So if this is 
true, and if this is a reason for not including the goal of reconciliation, it might suggest that 
they’d given it some thought while drafting the Rome Statute about what rules they would 
formulate and still they’ve done this one so they do feel that is has this deterrent effect. So in 
answer to your question, I don’t think it’s wise. 
 
Twelve trials that have been completed and only two have ended in convictions. When it 
comes to prevention, what is the ICC doing beyond trying to end impunity in preventative 
terms? 
I think in essence the argument the ICC is using is that by holding people accountable and 
fighting impunity, this in itself has a preventative function. But I think apart from those, the ICC 
is not engaged in any other activities that might have a preventative function. Although, you do 
see—and there’s discussion about that as well as to whether this is wise or not—you do see that 
the Prosecutor (because that is who represents the ICC) does implicitly at times warn States or 
individuals or groups not to commit any atrocities because the ICC is watching. Well, giving out 
those kinds of communications you could argue is an activity which aims to prevent people from 
committing further crimes. but then you can have the discussion about whether or not this is 
something the ICC Prosecutor should do. Is it part of its mandate to politically—because you 
enter the realm of politics much sooner if you  make such claims—should they do that or not? 
But I think that comes closest to other activities but prosecuting as such could have preventive 
action. But one of the other things—and this is perhaps a reservation I’d like to make with 
regards to the first answer—I do think that if you talk about deterrence and in particular you look 
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at the two cases which have been convicted, and in particularly in the child-soldiering case, this 
might come the closest to actually having a deterrent effect. I think deterring crimes against 
humanity is a broad concept—and prosecuting people is quite difficult. It’s not that you quickly 
have in a real case scenario, ‘Let’s not structurally kill big groups of people if they’re political 
enemies because that might amount to a crime against humanity and then the ICC might step in.’ 
I don’t see that happening, but I do see it happening that if you’re a local militia leader that you 
might say, ‘Well, we can recruit a lot of young men but beware and don’t get young boys 
because then I might be in trouble.’ And I think in the Lubanga case, I do trust that fighting child 
soldiering might be one of the best cases where it might have a deterrent effect because it’s such 
a rational choice to either recruit these youngsters or not whereas related to these other crimes, 
it’s not that obvious.  
 
The Court itself has received a lot of criticism in regards to international law and justice. 
How can the Court establish more legitimacy in the eyes of those who have criticized it so 
far? 
It depends. I think you first have to see why and what type of critique was given in relation to the 
lack of legitimacy. It could be that some are saying that the ICC only targets Africa and so then 
the argument would be to try to focus on cases outside of Africa. That’s one of the main claims 
and problems with legitimacy because the fact that they are incapable to prosecute individuals 
often does not really relate to legitimacy questions but rather than to practical issues. So another 
way to gain more legitimacy obviously is to get many more States on board with the Statute. So 
as to legitimacy, I think it is more those types of political dimensions which play an important 
role. 
 
How do you view Bensouda’s hibernation of the Darfur case? How does this impact the 
status or perception of the ICC and how might this affect the situation in Darfur? 
I’ve discussed with colleagues how to understand hibernation in the sense that it’s not a legal 
concept. It’s clear what she means with it: ‘We're not going to invest any more money or 
capacity on it’ but at the same time the case it still open so you could also wonder why explicitly 
mentions this. I don’t see a reason because I think in essence; the case has been hibernating for 
many years. So what’s the difference between now and two years ago? I don’t know if there is a 
real difference. But coming to your question ‘how does it affect,’ well, I think she wanted to 
make a very clear political signal that ‘listen, this is not going to work without cooperation of a 
lot of countries, including African countries who are Parties to the Rome Statute—who do still 
seem to support Sudan—who don’t expect us to succeed in any way. And I think it does 
negatively affect the situation in Darfur. I’m not much actively keeping track of Darfur but as I 
understand, atrocities are still ongoing and with the hibernation—and I think that might be an 
important consequence of her saying that—it’s not likely that we’ll see new suspects coming up 
from Darfur. This has, over the past years, happened that another minister was indicted or so and 
probably, that won’t be the case.  
On a much broader level, I think it does strengthen the idea that the ICC is not as powerful as 
many had hoped. 
 
Do you see her hibernation of the case as a statement on where the [UN] Security Council is 
and their lack of support since they made the referral? 
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Yeah, I can’t understand the active communication of Bensouda if it was not for that more 
political purpose. In legal terms, there is no need to publicly say ‘we are going to hibernate this 
case.’ Strategically, it’s unwise. In a normal, domestic setting, if you’re after a big organized 
crime suspect, it’s not likely that a Prosecutor would say ‘Well, we are going to hibernate this 
case because we can’t catch him.’ No, you only do so if you think that has some sort of political 
effect.  
 
One hundred twenty-three countries have ratified the Rome Statute yet more than half the 
world’s population is not protected under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Court has the 
potential for ‘universal jurisdiction,’ but countries like the U.S., Russia, China, and 
India—some with massive human populations have not signed. What needs to happen to 
increase the participation and cooperation of states that have been reluctant and/or defiant 
of the ICC so far? 
I guess for that reason, the ICC should only focus on important African states. I think that’s the 
biggest chance of these other countries signing up as well. So there is a very cynical answer. I 
think the more important the ICC becomes the less high the chances are that these important 
countries will ever sign. So the more toothless the tiger gets, the more likely that they will sign I 
think. There is no interest whatsoever for these countries to sign. Unless that they see that they 
can use it to their benefit and it is not to their benefit if it is powerful. And I think if you look at 
the latest signatories, they’re all very small countries. 
 
Like many Western-created institutions, the ICC has been critiqued for its approach to 
justice. Does the Court maintain an appropriate level of cultural sensitivity or is it too 
Western-centric? 
First of all, I think it’s good to note that the institute as such—be it based on common law or 
civil law—is Western by nature. So the idea that there is a Prosecutor representing the State, etc. 
is a Western conception but at the same time, through colonialism, etc. it now takes place in 
virtually every country in the world. So the idea of having a Court with the various actors related 
to it has Western origins but is as such by now, not necessarily a Western thing. Then when you 
look at how that Court functions and to what extent does it take cultural aspects sufficiently into 
account, that question in particular comes to light when witnesses are testifying that not enough 
attention is given to the cultural context of where they come from and to what extent they use 
concepts of time the way we do, etc.  
At the same time, I find it very difficult because I wonder how in their national jurisdictions, if 
they applied a formal type of law and court system, that there too it does matter if someone was 
at a certain place, on a certain date, and at a certain time. These are just issues that in the court 
context matter. So I do see the cultural challenges but I don’t think that the Court is disregarding 
them. I think they’re trying to cater to these challenges where possible but they will be an 
intrinsic problem of the Court. 
 
So the Central African Republic is now setting up a hybrid Special Criminal Court to work 
in cooperation with the ICC, where two active investigations already exist. The goal of the 
SCC is to more rapidly address the crimes being committed in the territory. Is the need for 
the SCC a reflection of the ICC or a reflection of a strong need of a judicial body and rule 
of law in CAR? 
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To be honest, I don’t know much about this new hybrid court. But I do think that in general, I do 
see this happening in the future more often for very practical reasons as well. The ICC is under 
budget and if you can find some other budget to set up another institution, that’s very easy. And 
at the same time, the ICC is pushing much more of the argument that ‘this is international 
criminal justice and we are just one element of it. It’s also domestic with the use of 
complementarity and domestic justice is most important.’  
I do think that we might see in the future more hybrid types of courts appearing for those 
practical courts. I really wonder if it’s a positive development because one of the main issues is 
that all of these hybrid tribunals will develop their own case law and because of that, it will be 
much more complex to come to some kind of a uniform harmonized body of international 
criminal law and I think that’s one of the side effects. 
 
Empirical data is difficult to obtain at the international level. Each conflict is unique in its 
context, trials are slow moving, we can’t measure what we can’t see, and there’s really no 
way to set up a control experiment on an international basis. Keeping this in mind, how do 
we go about measuring the success of the ICC’s prevention efforts and from that, can we 
determine if the ICC is an effective preventative/deterrent institution? 
I think what you could do and what would come closest—and this is more of a theoretical 
argument—but you can see in the domestic context what we know about effectiveness in terms 
of prevention. As criminologists we know that a reaction has to be swift, so fast and certain. If 
it’s swift and certain, and possible also where there’s more discretion about the sanctioning being 
harsh—the chances are that it has a high preventative effect. Of course, if in Singapore you over 
speak and there are a lot of people around and you get busted—and the chance of getting busted 
is very high—a week later you’re in court and you get a very hot sentence, then the chances are 
limited that your neighbor will do what you did and few people will do it as well. 
Then the theoretical argument with the ICC is that the chance of getting caught is very low, the 
reaction is very slow, and even as to punishment you could argue that it isn’t very severe. In 
regards to Lubanga, he was sentenced to 12 and 14 years. So in that sense, based on the 
theoretical argument and some sort of empirical argument that it’s also slow, you could argue 
that it is not likely to have a preventive function and I really wouldn’t know how to otherwise do 
empirical research apart from, for example—I’ve been thinking about how to set up a research 
lab like that—you could do interviews with mid-level commanders in militias in Africa to ask if 
they have heard their commanders referring to Lubanga and the fact that they should recruit/hire 
child soldiers or not. Something like that. So I guess going to mid-level commanders, asking 
‘what did your superiors want from you and did they ever mention the ICC’—that could come 
closest I guess to some sort of research. If you get a lot of people who respond one way, you 
have quite a good argument.  
 
The most consistent argument I’ve come across in support of the ICC’s existing 
preventative nature is the 2006 reference to Uganda and the fact that the LRA settled more 
so along the DRC border rather than Northern Uganda and was willing to come to the 
negotiation table. At this point, the LRA is still operating and Joseph Kony is still wanted 
so I’m wondering if it’s still accurate for scholars to call this example a success case of 
prevention 
No, and I’ve argued that it’s the other way around in Uganda. Did Kony come to the table—I 
think the peace accords were in 2006—because of the ICC warrant? In certain cases you can 
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really see that involvement of the ICC is likely to have a negative effect on stopping the violence 
taking place.  I think in Libya for example, with the ICC very quickly issuing an arrest warrant 
for Gaddafi, it made it very difficult for them to start peace negotiations with him because Jacob 
Zuma, for example, the South African President, in Libya at the time of the ICC warrant, wanted 
to barter a peace deal whether it would have been successful or not. But the ICC made the arrest 
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